Abstract--Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) technology is being increasingly used for data collection in Critical Infrastructures (CIs). The paper presents an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which is able to protect a CI from attacks directed to its WSN-based parts. By providing accurate and timely detection of malicious activities, the proposed IDS solution ultimately results in a dramatic improvement in terms of protection, since opportunities are given for performing proper remediation/reconfiguration actions, which counter the attack and/or allow the system to tolerate it. We present the basic ideas, discuss the main implementation issues, and perform a preliminary experimental campaign. Not only have experiments demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed approach in protecting the system against two very serious attacks to WSNs (namely: sinkhole, and bogus packet), but they have also proved that the stringent requirements (in terms of limited availability of resources) which are typical of current state-of-the-art WSN technologies, are met.
I. INTRODUCTION
RADITIONAL Critical Infrastructures (CIs) were intrinsically secure systems, due to a combination of factors, some of which are briefly described in the following:
• they consisted (almost exclusively) of special purpose devices, which were based on proprietary technologies; • individual sub-systems operated almost in isolation,
i.e. they did not interact with the external world, with the exception of the system being controlled; • they were largely based on dedicated (as opposed to shared) communication links;
• they massively relied on proprietary (as opposed to open) communication protocols. These trends have been largely subverted, and it will be even more so in the future. First, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have become an integral part of virtually any CI [9] . Second, Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components are being massively used for implementing Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems [6] . Third, subsystems are being connected using the infrastructure of the corporate Local Area Network (LAN), or even Wide Area Network (WAN) links, possibly including the public Internet, as well as wireless/ satellite trunks.
The typical architecture of current CIs has a hierarchical structure, which integrates heterogeneous devices and network trunks, also via shared network connections. To achieve interoperability, open communication protocols are being increasingly used, thus exposing SCADA systems to the same vulnerabilities which threaten general purpose Information Technology (IT) systems.
Evidence is showing that current CIs are already exposed to major security risks. As an example, in [5] it is reported that Cyberspies have penetrated the U.S. electrical grid and installed malicious software programs that could be used to disrupt the system. More in general, if one gets an opportunity to talk privately to the personnel in charge of IT security at electric utility companies or at the Department of Homeland Security, they say that they are extremely worried about security exposure of their SCADA systems.
It is worth emphasizing that we are witnessing a dramatic increase of external borne security incidents, while internal are basically stable, and accidental have increased only slightly (most probably, such a slight increase is mainly due to the increased complexity of the equipment, which results in more operator mistakes and interactions faults in general) [15] .
In particular, the shared communication infrastructure has become an obvious target for disrupting a SCADA network. For example, an attacker may exploit a vulnerability of the wireless trunk of a SCADA communication infrastructure to prevent real-time delivery of SCADA messages, which would result in the loss of monitoring information or even of the ability to control entire portions of the SCADA system. Nevertheless, it is foreseen that WSNs will be an integral part of a wide variety of CIs, for a number of reasons [9] , which can be grouped in two main categories:
Technical:
• WSN technology has the potential of significantly improving the sensing capabilities of SCADA subsystems, since it provides a wide variety of lowcost sensors, which can be easily and flexibly deployed [10] Regrettably, all currently available solutions have serious drawbacks, in terms of performance and/or applicability, as discussed in detail in section 0
The IDS solution that we propose in this paper is the result of a thorough analysis of the specific security issues, as well as of the architectural characteristics and constraints of WSNs, when embedded in a CI. The IDS is organized as a distributed application, consisting of several probes, which are deployed over the wireless clouds (as well as over the wired trunks) of a CI.
We explicitly emphasize some key advantages of our solution over existing ones, and in particular:
• It exploits specific characteristics of the most commonly used protocols for WSNs in SCADA systems (as opposed to many existing solutions, which are a mere porting of traditional IDS solutions for a wired setting).
• It looks at sensors as a main source and/or target of attacks (while in many existing products, this is not the case). We claim that security issues of the sensor level are key, since this level is typically the least protected one (for a number of reasons, and particularly the impossibility of using strong cryptographic techniques, due to the limited computing power available at the nodes, and the prohibitive costs in terms of battery consumption of cryptographic procedures).
• It provides the possibility of correlating information on attacks to the WSN clouds to information on malicious activities in the wired trunks of the SCADA system, which results in deeper understanding of the actual health of the system. To validate the proposed solution, an experimental campaign has been conducted, on top of a heterogeneous testbed, integrating COTS WSN products [7] and proprietary SCADA devices by a major vendor [12] . The experimental campaign focused on two emerging classes of attacks to WSNs, namely Sinkhole and Sleep Deprivation attacks [3] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II. provides an overview of the main vulnerabilities of WSNs routing protocols. Section 0 describes the architecture and operation of the proposed IDS solution, and includes a comparison to existing approaches. SectionIV. deals with implementation details, and Section V. presents the testbed setup and discusses experimental results, which confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Finally, Section VI. concludes the paper with some final remarks.
II. EXPLOITATION OF WSN ROUTING VULNERABILITIES
There is a wide variety of routing protocols for WSNs [4] . The most popular ones are Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) [32] and MultiHop [4] .
AODV is a reactive routing algorithm. It is the routing scheme adopted by ZigBee [33] [34] . When a WSN node using AODV protocol receives a packet addressed to an unknown destination, it starts to send "route discovery" packets (Route Request message -RREQ). A "route discovery" message is propagated throughout the network until a node finds an entry in its routing table matching the address, and responds to the request with a Route Reply message (RREP). Each message brings the receiving device to set a path in its routing table, if the sender of that message is an in-sight node. When the message reaches its destination, a backward path has been set along the intermediate nodes.
Multihop and its enhancements (e.g., CTP [22] , MintRoute [31] , and MultiHopLQI [8] ), use a shortest path first algorithm, which gives priority to the route to the base station having the lowest cost. The cost function can be based on either the hop count to the base station or on the estimate of the link bandwidth. These values are used to select the parent node, that is the neighbor node with the best path metric. Multihop nodes periodically send route update messages with routing information to their neighbors. These messages contain the measured Expected Transmission cost (ETX) to the base station and a measure of the link quality for every neighbor node. Since this protocol family implements no security features, malicious route updates can be used to perform an attack against a network.
A. Sinkhole attack
A sinkhole attack exploits the vulnerabilities of malicious node which has been previously compromised by an intruder. Starting from the assumption that an attacker gained access to a sensor node and changed its internal sta node forges false route packets with a low h the base station. In this way the malicious attractive to the surrounding sensors. In malicious node attracts neighboring nodes w information, which makes the attacker no intermediary. As a result, many sensor node route their traffic through the compromised n will thus be able to modify the content of the it, or launch additional attacks (e.g. sele attack, blackhole attack, and more).
In case the routing protocol being used by is AODV, then the attacker, which h compromised a node, broadcasts a RREQ f base station. Afterwards it sends a RREP, w maximum Destination Sequence Number a hop count. Every node which receives the i either reply to the malicious node (if a route t exists in its routing table), or broadcast the m eventually, will receive the RREP message fr node. This will cause it to assume that the co is along the best path to the base station a routing table accordingly.
Multihop routing protocol (MintRoute CTP, Xmesh) uses link quality estimates to table. The attacker sends false route messag neighbors about his attractive characteristic high link quality, and the like). Then, it interc the content of the routing packets so that the to have worse characteristics.
B. Sleep Deprivation
The precondition for a sleep deprivation malicious user has gained control of a WS node in Fig. 1 ). Assuming that the precond alternative attack techniques can be used:
1. the compromised node forwards th multiple times, 2. the compromised node generates fak high frequency.
Such techniques have two negative effect discharge of batteries of all the nodes alon orange nodes in Fig. 1 ) from the malicious station; and, ii) a Denial of Service for those nodes in Fig. 1 ) whose path towards the bas lines in Fig. 1 ) cross the attacked, overload the attacker and the base station (the red one)
In MultiHop a sleep deprivation attack can sending routing packets in broadcast. The atta the fake routing packets force some nodes parents, as in this case each fooled node will more traffic, the change to all its neighbors.
In AODV the attack may be conduc unnecessary routing requests (RREQ), or b RREP packets that force the creation of loop this case, due to the loops, packets are for In this section, we i) analyze the r a CI which includes WSN zones, ii principles of the solution that we pr main advantages of our solution approaches). Focus is on security iss thorough treatment of issues which wired part can be found in [20] .
IDS solutions proposed for WS two main classes: centralized [ [25] [21] solutions.
In centralized solutions, sensor running on a host which is connected data. The IDS agent analyzes the ongoing attacks. Since routing att packets from reaching the IDS approaches the IDS agent may get to network, and ultimately fail to detec the major drawbacks of centralized a
In decentralized solutions, it is th the logic for detecting the attac solutions are potentially more re attacks, since it is still possible that a even in the event of severe d infrastructure (although in this case system getting to a wrong decision view of the global status). Addition need the execution of agreement pro to share its local view of the networ This results in consumption of add due to an increased number of transm Another typical classification of the kind of analysis which is used classes of IDSs are available: mis based. In misuse based IDSs, th knowledge base, in the form of characterize the kinds of (known) m attacker may conduct. At runtim compares the profile of the current the known attacks. If a match is fou anomaly based solutions, the detec what is assumed to be the "normal he sensor nodes which run ks. As such, distributed esilient to network level attacks be detected locally, damage to the network there is a risk of the IDS n, due to a non consistent nally, distributed solutions otocols to allow each node rk with a set of neighbors. ditional resources, mainly missions. IDS solutions is based on d to spot an attack. Two suse based, and anomaly he detection agent has a attack signatures, which malicious activities that the me, the detection agent traffic to the signatures of und, an alarm is raised. In ction agent is trained with l" behavior of the system, (typically represented through a mathemat compares the actual behavior of the system a profile: any deviation from the normal behav as a potential attack. Misuse based solutio more accurate (particularly because they typ lower false positive rates), but they are unabl called zero day attacks (and more in genera unknown attack). On the other hand, anomal can potentially achieve present a higher det they can spot virtually any kind of attack), b exhibit a higher number of "false positive" ( recognized as an attack).
We propose a hybrid detection solution runs a detection agent which is in charg suspicious nodes. Suspicious nodes are insert a blacklist and an alarm is sent to the centra decision is demanded to the central agent. As for the IDS agents running on the wir following design constraints apply, which characteristics of WSNs [28] :
• Low memory footprint: agents m possible amount of memory; • Low CPU usage: agents must algorithm, to minimize CPU load a • Low network footprint: since c power consuming, agents mus number of messages which are exc Fig. 2 shows the architecture of our hybr The solution we propose combines misuse an techniques in a two-level distributed hierarc resilience and performance. The IDS Loc running on a sensor node, is made of: i) t Monitor that is in charge of analyzing th through the node; ii) the Control Data Coll measures to be sent to the IDS Central Ag Local Detection Engine that is in charge suspicious activities and rising alerts; b) rec from the CA; and c) performing possible The Local Detection Engine works by ident events with respect to measures taken by Collector. The occurrence of specific comb events is taken as a "weak" detection of an on triggers temporary reaction actions. The usag based approach for local detection might r number of false positives. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATIO

A. Implementation of the Attacker
The malicious node runs an att implements a modified version of sinkhole attack or a sleep deprivation While conducting a sinkhole a pretends to have a very low Expect modifies the value of its LEEP (L Protocol) packets, both values are u estimate the bidirectional link qua conservative protocol in the sense already established paths, the attac values with a very high frequency in changes in the routing tables of the v As for the sleep deprivation, we i forwarding the same packets mult implementation of the sleep depriv received packets in an internal que queue) which is scanned in orde duplicate packets. To avoid its fake the attacker retransmits them with a the last received packets queue of fixed length (say N), after the victim duplicated packets all the previous fa of the last received packets queue able to recognize an older packet as 4 for intermittent anomalies. y the LA can be made arge of recognizing attacks alarms sent by LAs. In ed on patterns of attack When the CA makes its pagates the decision to the sed by the Local Detection ing actions: a blacklist; osing one of the nodes not nt; o the CA containing the the CA; if such a response mes that the attacker is eaching the CA and forces m point 1 until either a on made by the CA is ours have been assessed as the blacklist is empted and ce, due to local reactions, a ould be established. the attack, the LA empties o regular mode. Else if the ongoing attack, the LA ng for a reaction activity ON DETAILS tack injection tool, which CTP to perform either a n attack. attack the malicious node ted Transmission cost, and Link Estimation Exchange used by neighbor nodes to ality. Since the CTP is a e that it tries to preserve cker has to transmit fake n order to be able to force victim nodes. implemented the attack by iple times. In CTP-based vation attack, nodes store eue (last received packets er to detect and discard e packets being discarded certain latency. In fact, as f the victim nodes have a m node has received N nonake-packets are shifted-out and the node is no more a duplicate.
B. Implementation of the IDS Local Agent
The IDS Local Agent (LA) collects control data by using either specific CTP utility interfaces (CtpInfo, CtpPacket) or ad-hoc counters added in the send and forward event handlers and in the link estimator sub-system. Nodes can automatically transmit status information to the base station. Examples of such information include the radio traffic, parent node and neighbors, number of generated data messages, number of generated routing messages, number of forwarded messages, number of dropped messages, number of retransmitted messages, etc. Instead of measuring the exact values of such parameters, the LA estimates their average values. Average values are computed in the form of Exponential Moving Averages (EMAs) with the following formula:
where EMA t(i) is the value of the average at time i, M t(i) is the new value of the considered parameter, and N is the length of the sliding window considered for the evaluation of the average.
The motivation for using EMAs instead of moving averages is twofold: i) in order to evaluate the EMA at time i the node must only store the value of the EMA at time i-1 (this allows for reducing the memory space used in the node); ii) EMA is more reactive to changes of the measured parameter than the moving averages, thus resulting in a lower detection latency.
A node generates an alert for one of the monitored parameters, if its EMA value falls outside a reference interval.
Depending on the anomalous parameter the IDS LA considers some of the neighbors as suspicious. After a node is recognized as suspicious, it is inserted into a blacklist. The blacklist is implemented by adding a flag column to the existing CTP neighbour table stored in each node.
C. Implementation of the IDS Central Agent
The CA combines the alerts obtained from LAs to decide if they must be confirmed or discarded. The criteria behind alert correlation are attack specific. In the implementation of the IDS Central Agent we focused on a sinkhole attack. In this case we assume that there is an ongoing attack if the majority of the neighbors of a node have raised alerts for anomalous routing parameters, like BRVC (number of beacon packets received) and SND (number of beacon packets sent). Fig. 3 shows the dynamic of the EMA values for the following metrics: number of beacon packets sent (bsnd), number of beacon packets received (brcv), number of data packets sent (snd), number of forwarded packets (fwd), number of dropped packets (drp), number of retransmitted packets (rtr), number of not expected packets (alien).
The EMAs values are monitored for an attacker (the first graph) and three neighbor victim nodes (graph from the second to the fourth). At time 25 the steady state is reached.
At time 32 the second node shows an anomaly (it got a new child) and its LA raises an alert. The CA will discard such an alert since just one out of three nodes is misbehaving. At time 45 the malicious node launches a sinkhole attack. All the neighbor nodes show multiple anomalies, hence resulting in alerts being thrown. In this case the CA confirms the alert and gives evidence of an ongoing attack. Our experimental campaign was cond INSPIRE project testbed shown in Fig. 4 . Th of wired sensors, which are connected to a su through Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), which has been developed to connect wirele rest of the SCADA system via a programm base station, a legacy RTU manufactured b [12] , which receives data from wired field GLAW SCADA server developed by Elsag RTU [13] , and a supervisory station running server. The wireless sensor network is comp CrossBow [7] IRIS motes and a CrossBo programming board. Each IRIS mote is e Atmega128 processor, an Atmel RF230 compliant) radio transceiver, and a CrossBo and temperature sensor board. Sensors run Ti CTP.
We conducted our experiments on a simu simulation was performed by using TOS simulation run was conducted with a numbe between 100 and 250 and the following s attacker, nodes are stationary, and a number each node between 5 and 10. The results o tests were confirmed by executing an experi on a real network consisting of a number from eight to fifteen. At each run of the network we physically deployed the nodes accepted best practices for WSN deploymen to avoid common pitfalls (e.g., configurat points of failure -i.e. nodes whose failu partitioning of the network -were avoided).
The campaign was conducted followin shown in Fig. 5 .
The workflow includes four phases periodically generate control messages w processed by the IDS CA module (Phase 1) ongoing attacks and identify the attacker.
During Phase 2 the malicious behavior of is triggered. During Phase 3, the nodes unde anomalous behavior, ii) put the su list, and iii) generate alert messages. to the IDS CA, which in turn -base which have been gathered and the r decision. It is worth noting that t checks control packets also in abse able to detect possible attacks evadin the Local Agents.
Experiments were conducted f attack. To compare our hybrid solut solution, we deployed two different
In scenario A we assume that the sensor data, but it does not modify th are used for detection purposes. In s the attacker is smarter, and it is ab messages (data and control packets). A first test session was executed made of a random number of sensor 100 different topologies each in 10 each run a random node behaves as t the simulation tests have been valida those attained in the real network en the average values of detection rate. simplified condition (Scenario A) optimal results. Conversely, when t centralized IDS is ineffective, whe still performs well. The detection rate of our h comparable to the performance of a configuration environment of scen study, the detection rate for routing and 95% depending on the consumed Given a certain detection rate, i resulting number of false positives. I rate of the distributed solution is co rate of our hybrid solution, the fa 6 er attack: i) recognize an spicious nodes in a black . In Phase 4, alerts are sent ed on the control messages received alerts -makes its the IDS CA continuously ence of alerts. Hence it is ng detection performed by focusing on the sinkhole tion to a purely centralized scenarios. e malicious node modifies he control messages which scenario B, we assume that ble to modify all received .
paign workflow with a simulated network rs. In this session we tested 0 different simulations. In the attacker. The results of ated by comparing them to nvironment. Table 1 shows It is quite evident that in a both approaches provide the attacker is smarter, the ereas our hybrid approach NEIGHBORHOOD SIZE = 8) Scenario B < 20% 93-96% hybrid approach is also distributed solution in the nario B. As a reference g attacks is, between 90% d memory [20] . it is worth comparing the In [21] , when the detection omparable to the detection alse positives ratio ranges from 6 to 10 percent. In our solution we had a percentage of false positive of about 3%. In terms of memory usage, the size of the IDS agent of the hybrid system is comparable with the fingerprint of the agents of a fully distributed systems running TinyOS [25] [26] , as shown in Table 2 . The proposed system relies on a hybrid detection approach in the sense that any node runs a detection agent which is in charge of identifying suspicious nodes. In order to validate the system an experimental campaign has been conducted, which demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed approach against some emerging attacks to WSNs, namely sinkhole attacks and sleep deprivation attacks. Also importantly, results demonstrated that our solution satisfies the stringent requirements (in terms of limited availability of resources) which are typical of Wireless Sensor Networks.
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